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Abstract 
Error-laden data can negatively affect clinical and 
operational decision making, research findings and funding 
allocation. This study examined the number and types of data 
errors in an electronic medical record (EMR) system in a 
Drug and Alcohol service. Specifically, errors in service data 
were examined. 9,379 errors were identified from ten error 
reports generated between March 2015 and May 2016, three 
months after the implementation of the EMR system. These 
errors were grouped into four types: mismatched data fields 
(60.5%), duplicate medical record error (3.2%), date/time 
error (8.8%) and blank field error (27.4%). The errors can be 
prevented by adding functions such as alert messages in the 
EMR system. How and why the errors occur need to be 
investigated in future studies. 
Keywords: Electronic Medical Records; Error; Drug and 
Alcohol Service  
Introduction 
The adoption and use of health information systems (HIS) 
have made large amount of digital data available for use in 
clinical and operational decision making [1], research [2] and 
funding allocation [3]. However, data errors may jeopardize 
the realisation of these purposes. For example, Ward et al. 
found that data errors in HIS time stamp can compromise the 
ability of an emergency department to accurately determine its 
operational performance [1].  
Inherent data errors in clinical research databases may 
negatively impact the research findings [4, 5]. In a study 
comparing the estimation results of mortality rates using an 
error-free database and an error-seeded database, authors 
found that the overestimated mortality rates are typical results 
of using the latter database [6]. The estimates can be  more 
than double the true value [6].  
Error-laden data can also lead to mis-allocation of healthcare 
funding. In a study examing the consequences of miscoding in 
a hospital in Australia, authors found that about 16% of 
inpatient cases discharged from a specialised surgical unit 
during a six-month time period were miscoded. This led to an 
approximately $575,000 underpayment to the hospital [3].  
Understanding the types and number of errors in an 
organization’s HIS is thus useful for managers to develop 
strategies to prevent errors. This will ensure that the HIS truly 
supports  organisational performance measurement, decision 
making, research and funding allocation.  
Data errors identified by previous studies include time stamp 
error [1], miscoding [3], missing data [7], data transfer error 
[8], spelling error [9], duplicate records [10, 11], drop-down 
menu selection error [10] and inconsistencies between data 
fields [12]. 
Causes of these errors are related to HIS design and how HIS 
are used [8]. For example, the drop-down menu selection error 
may be caused by too many items in the drop-down list or 
items being too close together [13]. Spelling error may be 
attributed to healthcare providers documenting in a rush 
without proofreading [9]. 
Alcohol is one of the major risks for both physical and social 
health. Excessive consumption of alcohol can cause a wide 
range of harms including road accidents, domestic and public 
violence, family breakdown, crime, liver disease and brain 
damage [14]. Between 2014 and 2015, more than 115,000 
Australians received over 170,000 treatment episodes from 
publicly-funded Drug and Alcohol (D&A) service [15].  
In 2013, the public health in New South Wales (NSW), 
Australia moved from lump-sum funding of D&A services to 
funding based on treatment activities. The effectiveness of this 
new model of funding is substantially relied on the precision 
of data recorded in a HIS. Inaccurate recording may not only 
affect the amount of funding allocated to a D&A service, but 
also the managerial decisions made using this data, for 
example in policy making, service planning, research and 
education [16]. To our knowledge, however, no study has 
investigated the precision of D&A service data under this 
model of funding.  
Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the number and 
types of errors in service data in a D&A service in NSW, 
Australia.  
Methods 
Study setting 
This study was conducted in a D&A service in NSW, 
Australia.  
Data source 
An electronic medical record (EMR) system was implemented 
in December 2014. Service activity data were extracted by 
performance unit staff from the EMR system and uploaded to 
Web Non-Admitted Patient (WebNAP), a system that reported 
outpatient activities to NSW Ministry of Health for use in state 
health policy decision making including funding. 
The WebNAP system matched the uploaded activity data with 
its predefined activity classification. When the data did not 
match the classification, the WebNAP system identified an 
error and automatically recorded it in an error report. For 
example, the WebNAP activity classification showed that 
D&A was a community service, therefore D&A healthcare 
providers should always choose community as their setting 
type. If a provider chose hospital, an error occurred. 
Datasets 
Ten error reports generated between March 2015 and May 
2016, three to 14 months after implementation of the system,  
were provided by the information manager in the D&A 
service. This relates to approximately 150,000 records per 
year for 60,000 patients. On past experience, errors would be 
expected in 7% of the records with more than one error in 2% 
of these. 
An error report contains the following data fields in an excel 
spreadsheet: clinic name, healthcare worker’s name, client 
name, client medical record number, error description, 
appointment date/time, service date/time, referral date/time, 
referral receipt date/time, service type, provider type, setting 
type, modality of care, financial class, Department of 
Veterans' Affairs (DVA) card type and DVA card number.  
Names of healthcare workers and clients were deidentified to 
maintain confidentiality. 
Data analysis  
Data on error description was extracted for analysis by the 
researchers. The errors are labelled based on the feedback 
from the WebNAP system and were further grouped to higher 
level categories. The number of each type of error was 
counted. 
Ethics approval 
Ethics approval to conduct this study was granted by the joint 
Health and Medical Human Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Wollongong and the Illawarra & Shoalhaven 
Local Health District. Access to the error reports was granted 
by the service manager of the D&A service. Consent was 
obtained from healthcare providers for their error reports to be 
used in this study. 
Results 
Types of Errors in D&A Service Data 
The identified errors were grouped into four types: 
‘mismatched data fields’, ‘duplicate record’, ‘date/time error’ 
and ‘blank field’ (see Table 1).  
There were two types of ‘mismatched data fields’. One was 
‘service option error’ and the other was ‘DVA information 
error’. ‘Service option error’ occurred when one of the three 
data entry fields- provider type, modality of care and setting 
type- did not match what was set up in the WebNAP 
classification. Provider type described the job role of a 
healthcare provider e.g. a registered nurse, a psychologist or a 
counsellor. Modality of care was the means for delivery of a 
service e.g. telephone, email or face-to-face meeting between 
a healthcare provider or a group of healthcare providers and a 
client. Setting type was the location where the service was 
provided e.g. hospital, community or home.  
The ‘DVA information error’ occurred when the information 
provided in the two data entry fields - DVA card details and 
financial classification - did not match with each other. There 
were two situations. One was ‘DVA card details supplied but 
financial classification is not DVA’ and the other was 
‘financial classification is DVA but missing DVA card 
details’.  
‘Duplicate medical record’ occurred when more than one 
encounter was created for a client in the EMR system. 
However, a client could only have one active encounter at a 
time. 
The ‘date/time error’ was related to referral date/time, referral 
receipt date/time, service start date/time and service end 
date/time. These date/times include time information. The 
logical order of these date/times must be as follows: the 
referral date/time should be earlier than the referral receipt 
date/time which should be earlier than the service start 
date/time and the service end date/time. When this order was 
turned around, an error occurred. 
The last data error type was ‘blank field’ which occurred when 
a data entry field was blank. The identified blank fields were 
provider type, funding source, financial classification and 
address fields including post code, suburb and street.  
Table 1– Number and types of errors in service data in the 
EMR system in a D&A service. 
Error types Number % 
Total 9379 100 
Mismatched data fields 5675 60.5 
Service option error (provider type, 
modality of care or setting type does 
not match what is in WebNAP clas-
sification.) 
5650 60.2 
*DVA information error (DVA card 
details supplied but financial classi-
fication is not DVA, or financial 
classification is DVA but missing 
DVA card details) 
25 0.3 
   
Duplicate medical record  
A second encounter is created in the 
EMR, but a client can only have one 
active encounter at a time 
303 3.2 
   
Date/time error 834 8.8 
Service start date/time is after service 
end date/time 
591 6.3 
Referral receipt date/time is after ser-
vice date/time or before referral 
date/time 
145 1.5 
Referral date/time is after service start 
date/time 
98 1 
   
Blank field  2567 27.4 
Blank provider type 2473 26.4 
Blank post code 36 0.4 
Blank suburb 21 0.2 
Blank street 21 0.2 
Blank funding source code 10 0.1 
Blank financial classification 6 0.1 
*DVA: Department of Veterans' Affairs 
 
Number of Errors in Each Error Type 
Overall, 9,379 errors were identified from the error reports 
(see Table 1). 60.5% of the errors were ‘mismatched data 
fields’, of which majority was ‘service option error’. 27.4% 
were ‘blank field’ with ‘blank provider type’ being the error 
that occurred most frequently. ‘Date/time error’ accounted for 
8.8% of the total number of errors. ‘Service start date/time is 
after service end date/time’ was the major error which 
accounted for 6.3%. ‘Duplicate medical record’ was the least 
frequently occurring error which accounts for 3.2% of the total 
errors. 
Discussion 
As errors in operational data can be pervasive in the 
immediate period after the implementation of HIS [7], this 
study focused on analysing error reports for an EMR system 
three to 14 months after its implementation. The large amount 
of errors found in this study may be due to the learning curve 
of healthcare providers. Further study will investigate trend in 
data errors over time. 
We classified errors into four types. This is useful for 
investigating causes of error and developing different 
prevention and mitigation strategies required for different 
error types.  
Causes of these errors might be related to the EMR system 
design issue, how the system was used, the environment in 
which it was used or a combination of them. For example, this 
study found that ‘service option error’ was the most common 
error in the D&A service data and wrong selection of ‘setting 
type’ was one immediate reason for it. In the WebNAP 
reporting system, the D&A service was mapped as a 
community setting. That means all healthcare providers 
working in the D&A service must select ‘community’ for 
setting type, regardless where the service was provided. This 
would ensure that funding was allocated to D&A service. 
Some of the healthcare providers, although employed to work 
for the D&A service, were responsible for providing this 
specialist service in a hospital setting. A D&A healthcare 
provider might select ‘hospital’ for the setting type, because 
he or she provided the service there. This would result in a 
‘service option error’ because the setting type of ‘hospital’ 
was not mapped in the WebNAP system for the D&A service. 
If this error was not corrected, funding would be misplaced to 
the hospital setting, instead of D&A service. 
The term ‘setting type’ may confuse healthcare providers, 
especially new employees, on whether it means the location of 
service provided or the healthcare service by which the 
healthcare provider was employed. This could be one reason 
for the error to occur. 
Another reason might be the design issue of the WebNAP 
system. The system used ‘setting type’ to determine which 
healthcare service would get funding. Actually, it could have 
used the information about the healthcare service by which the 
healthcare provider was employed to determine the correct 
‘setting type’. This suggested that the system designer did not 
really understand how healthcare providers worked and how 
funding was allocated. Extraction of correct data elements 
would eliminate the error and ensure correct funding 
allocation. 
A mix of system design issue and the environmental condition 
under which end users use the system may contribute to the 
occurrence of error. This study found that ‘date/time error’ 
accounted for almost 9% of the total number of errors. 
Date/time data were required from three forms that D&A 
healthcare providers used in the EMR system: intake form, 
assessment form and clinical note. The intake form was used 
when a client first contacted the D&A service. The assessment 
form was used to assess the person after intake. The clinical 
note was used in the subsequent visits of the client. The entire 
journey of the person with the D&A service from intake to 
discharge is an ‘encounter’. Each contact of the person with 
the D&A service may contain serveral ‘services’, e.g. 
counselling, rehabilitation or supervised medication 
administration. The three forms were used at different stages 
of the encounter. The intake form and the assessment form 
were used in the beginning of this encounter. The clinical note 
was used multiple times until the closure of the encounter. 
Within each form, the service start date/time must be before 
the service end date/time. However, the way to record service 
start and end date/time is different among the three forms (see 
Table 2). The intake form automatically populated service 
start date/time from the computer, but required healthcare 
providers to manually enter end date/time. The assessment 
form required both start and end date/time to be manually 
entered. The clinical note required a manual entry of start 
date/time, but automatically filled in the end date/time. This 
mixed ways of recording date/time opens opportunities for 
error.  
Another reason for the error to occur might be the 
environmental condition under which healthcare providers 
recorded data. Sitting with a client and recording data in a 
computer at the same time may increase the probablity of 
making error. Automatic time recording may have better data 
accuracy than manual time recording [17]. A check of 
date/time by the EMR system at the data entry stage may also 
help to prevent the erroneous data from being recorded. 
Table 2– How service start and end date/time is recorded. 
Forms Service start 
date/time 
Service end 
date/time 
Intake form Auto-populated, can 
be adjusted manually 
Manually entered 
Assessment 
form 
Manually entered Manually entered 
Clinical note Manually entered Auto-populated, can 
be adjusted manually 
 
A lack of alert message function in the system may open 
opportunity for error. For example, although the percentage of 
‘duplicate medical record’ is not high in this study, duplicate 
records can mislead healthcare providers in clinical decision 
making because they may miss important information that 
exists in a different record [11]. This error may also cause 
confusion in information retrieval [18]. Disruptive pop-up 
alert message [4] built into an EMR system may help to 
decrease this error.  
The ‘blank provider type’ is the second common error found 
in this study. This error might be caused by system 
dysfunction. It may also be due to the inability of the system 
administrator to keep up with the workload of correctly 
mapping the providers in the WebNAP system–because of the 
high turnover of D&A staff, or lack of information on changes 
in roles for staff members or new staff in the service. Further 
study is needed to investigate how and why this error 
occurred. 
Since the service data were first extracted by the performance 
unit staff before submitting to WebNAP, it was possible that 
the errors reported in this study could also be injected during 
the process of data extraction.  
With the increased use of EMR, research using EMR data has 
been prospering, for example in EMR phenotyping [19], 
clinical workflow modelling [20] and disease prediction [21]. 
The strength of evidence from the secondary analysis of EMR 
data can be hindered by errors contained in these data [4, 5]. 
In the case mentioned in the introduction section, the study 
comparing the estimation results of mortality rates using an 
error-free database and an error-seeded database, the analysis 
result using the error-laden data was more than double the true 
results using the error-free data [6]. This shows the negative 
impact of erroneous data in reducing accuracy of  data 
analytics and lead to invalid findings. Therefore, data errors 
and their causes need to be identified, reduced or eliminated to 
ensure high data quality to provide accurage evidence for 
research and health decision making [22]. 
Limitation  
We did not analyse all the error reports generated after the 
implementation of the EMR system. This was because there 
was no health information manager at the D&A service for a 
period of three months. Consequently no error reports were 
downloaded in this period. However, the errors made during 
that time period rolled over to the following months’ reports, 
so we think that we had all errors analysed. Directly 
interviewing the healthcare providers who made the errors 
would give further insights about the reasons for the errors 
made, which would be beneficial for learning to prevent errors 
in the EMR system.  
Conclusion 
Error-laden data can jeopardize clinical and operational 
decision making [1], research findings [6] and funding 
allocation [3]. To manage errors, it is paramount for D&A 
service to understand the nature and extent of error and the 
environment that induce error [23].  
This study investigated the number and types of errors in 
service data in a D&A service. The identified errors were 
grouped into four error types: ‘mismatched data fields’ 
(60.5%), ‘duplicate medical record’ (3.2%), ‘date/time error’ 
(8.8%) and ‘blank field’ (27.4%). The top three most frequent 
sub errors were ‘service option error’, ‘blank provider type’ 
and ‘service start date/time is after service end date/time’. The 
results from this study underscore the importance of 
understanding errors in EMR data. Further study will 
investigate the trend in data errors overtime and how and why 
errors occur in the EMR system. 
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